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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KIM L. NORRIS, LEX R. NORRIS, and
LANNY T. NORRIS, d/b/a L.K.L.
ASSOCIATES, a partnership, and
TAYLOR NATIONAL REAL ESTATE, a
corporation,
Pl&intiffe and Appellanta,

v.
A. M. ANDERSON and NORA S. ANDERSON,
h~sband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Caae No. 15718

Defendants and Respondents.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action to compel specific performance of an
alleged agreement for the sale of real property or, in the
alternative, for payment of a real estate commission.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court found in favor of defendants, held
that no contract was formed, and dismissed the Complaint of
plaintiffs, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and appellants respectfully request that this
Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At all times material hereto, the plaintiffs and appellants,
Kim L. Norris, Lex R. Norris, and Lanny T. Norris, were brothers
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and partners doing business as a partnership under the natne anal
style of L.k.L. Associates, and the plaintiff and appellant,
Taylor National Real Estate, was a corporation doing business
as a real ~t;tate agency, with its principal place '.of business
located in Orem, Utah.

At all times material hereto, the defe

ants and respondents, A .M. Anderson and Nora S. Anderson, were
husband and wife, residing in Orem, Utah.
On SeI)lember 10, 1976, the Andersons entered into a Sales
Agency Conttact with Boley Realty, Inc., of American Fork,
Utah, for ~bltiple listing of a tract of land whicH they
owned in OrQm, Utah.

Dean Hall, salesman for Boley Realty,

i

int:., prepafed the listing agreement (Exhibit "l")

which

specified a total sales price of $250,000.00, with' a down payin

of $40,000.do, and terms for the payment of the balance tbbe
negotiated

~ith

the sellers.

(Tr., pp. 11-12, 116)

On Friday, January 7, 1977, the plaintiffs, L.K.L.
Associates, by and through their agent, Bryce Taylor, sal~smah
foi- the plaintiff, Taylor National Real Estate, made an offer
putchase the property.

(Exhibit "2")

Said offer ddmittedly

did not comfHy with the terms of the listing, in that i t consisted of $5 ,000. 00 down and $15 ,000. 00 payable on January 301
1977, or oniy one-half of the down payment required by the

•

listing agr~ement, and it contained various other differihg
terms and conditions.

(Tr. pp. 40, 95)

On Sattirday, January 8, 1977, Bryce Tayidr and Dean Hall
met with the Andersons to present the offer.

At that time,
~

the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase

.

(E!xhibit "2"1
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was complete through the signature of L.K.L. Associates
on line 57.

(Tr., pp. 12, 26, 95, 117)

Because the terms of

this offer were at variance with the terms of the listing
agreement, and because of the size and nature of the transaction,
the Andersons wanted some time to evaluate and consider it.
(Tr. , pp. 2 7 , 9 5 , 118)
After due consideration, Mr. Anderson rejected plaintiffs' offer outright.

(Tr., pp. 13, 95)

On the morning of Tuesday, January 11, 1977, the Andersons
met with Mackey Boley and Dean Hall and reviewed the plaintiffs'
offer.

Being concerned with the ability of the Norris

brothers to perform, and not wanting to release title to
the land before it was paid for, nor to accept a second
m~rtgage

upon land which they already owned outright, all of

which were conditions of the plaintiffs' offer, the Andersons
formulated a counter-offer consisting of seven points, which
was drafted at the office of Boley Realty, Inc. in American
Fork on that day.

(Tr. , pp. 13, 95, 118-119)

In the afternoon of that same day

(Tuesday, January 11,

1977), Dean Hall met with Bryce Taylor, the plaintiffs',
Norris's agent, at the Andersons' home to present the counteroffer.

I

At that time, a separate page incorporating the

seven points of the defendants' counter-offer was attached
to plaintiffs' original offer, and now appears as page two
of Exhibit "2".

After conununicating to and reviewing the

terms of the defendants' counter-offer with Bryce Taylor,

Mr. Anderson crossed out lines 48 through 55 on page one of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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Exhibit "2"

(plaintiffs' original offer), the samE1 being

unacceptabl~

to him.

At the Andersons' direction, Bryce Taylor then wrote
the handwritten language which appears below line 57 on
page one of txhibit "2" (plaintiffs' original offed, as
follows:
Seller lgrees to the terms above stated with
the indbrporation df the seven points outlined
on the,~ttached arnrnendment [sic.] sheet. Subject
to buyet's acceptance within five days.
(Emphasis

aodea. 1

Mr. and Mrs~ Atiderson then each signed both pages ~f Exhitiit

"2", and Mrl Anderson dated both pages on that date, January
11 1 1977.

l~r., pp. 13~14, 28-29, 41-42, 95-97, 119~120)

Upon cdfupletion of the defendants' counter-offer,
Mi'. Andersod handed it to Dean Hall, .who in turn handed it
td_ Bryce Ta:fior •. (Tr., pp. 15-16) Bryce Taylor, ha-Virig
',

.

b~~n

I,

hq

engageJ. by tHe Norris brothers as their agent

c6tnniuni·

cate with Bdley t~alty, Inc., the listing agency, ad4 Dean
Hall, its sJiesman, in all matters relative to the purchase
'I

of thel prop~tty, and having presented their original offer
to

the deferiaants, then took the defendants' countet~offet,

Exhibit "2" j to the Norris brothers for their consi.deratidn.
(Tr., pp. 24~30)
Bryce ~.ylor was urtsure as to when he presented the
defendants' bounter-offelr to the Norris brothers.

(Tr., ~P·

29-30) On Friday, January 14, 1977, L.K.L. Associates, by

and through tum L. Norris, allegedly

accepted five of the

seven points of the Andersons' counter-offer.

This qualified
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acceptance was handwritten beneath the signatures of the
Andersons on their counter-offer, at page two of Exhibit
"2", and was made expressly subject to the following conditions:
Buyer agrees to counter-offer subject to deletion
of 50' easement and subject to seller's acceptance
of second mortgage provision contained in original
offer.
(Emphasis added.)
This qualified and conditional acceptance was apparently
then signed by Kim L. Norris and dated on that date, January
14, 1977

(Exhibit "2"; Tr., pp. 30, 42-43, 72-73), but was

never at that time delivered to the defendants in written
form.
After obtaining the plaintiffs' qualified and conditional
acceptance of the defendants' counter-offer, Bryce Taylor
called Dean Hall to advise him of that development, and to
arrange a new meeting with the Andersons.

Dean Hall, in

turn, conununicated verbal notice of the plaintiffs', Norris's,
conditional acceptance of the defendants' counter-offer to
the Andersons, informing them that two of the seven points
of their counter-offer were unacceptable to L.K.L. Associates
(Norris brothers) and arranged to discuss the matter with
them on the following day.

(Tr., pp. 16, 30, 44-45, 97,

120-121)

The next evening, Saturday, January 15, 1977, Bryce
Taylor and Dean Hall met again at the Andersons' home.

At

that time, Mr. Taylor attempted to persuade the Andersons to
delete the two points of their counter-offer which the Norris
brothers had found unacceptable.

Mr. Anderson was adamant
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in stating that he would not delete those two· points from his
counter-off~r,

and that the counter-offer had to be accepted

by the Norris brothers exactly ~written.

(Tr.,

ptJ.

16-b,

9b-99, 104-iosi 111-112, 113, 121-122>
Mr. Anderson told Bryce Taylor that the Norris brothers

still had otte day left before the expiration of the five-day
·1

time limit tJn the counter-offer, made on Tuesday, .;·anuary 11,
1977, and that he would honor his conunitment until, that 'time,

(Tt&, pp. 104-105, 113)

However, Mr. Anderson did not on

that date sie or receive the written, qualified, and conditional acceptance allegedly obtained by Bryce Taylor.from
L.K.L. Associates the day before.

The meeting endei:i.1 with

no agreemen~ reached, and no definite arrangements ~ere
tb meet agalh.

nJae

(Tr. , pp. 17, 44, 46, 99, 121-122, b4-136)

On Monday, January 17, 1977, Dean Hall called Mr. Anci.erso•
tb

determinS how he felt about the purported qualified and

cbhditional hcceptance of his counter-offer.

Mr. Ahd~rsorl

refused to b~nd on either of the two points of his codnteroffer,

and teiterated that he would only accept it

written and $ubmitted.

(Tr., pp.

122, 137)

as

On the same

day (January 17, 1977), Mr. Hall called Bryce Tayior and
conveyed this information to him.
Norris brothl!rs can do no ~·"

Mr. Taylor replied,

"~

(Tr.~ pp. 34 .... 35t 47, 122-12li

i

137-138)

Dean Hail then called Mr. Anderson back, and informed
him of Bryce Taylor's words, "The Norris brothers <!:an do no
more."

Mr. Anderson then told Dean Hall that the counter-
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offer had expired, and that the deal was off.

He did not

say that he would stand on the counter-offer on that day.
(Tr., pp. 18-20)
On Tuesday, January 18, 1977, seven days after the
defendants' counter-offer was presented, Bryce Taylor called

Dean Hall back and informed him that the Norris brothers
wanted to accept the Andersons' counter-offer.
35-36, 123-124)

(Tr., pp.

Mr. Taylor had earlier conferred with the

Norris brothers, who, by and through Lanny T. Norris, had
apparently lined out the language of their qualified and
conditional acceptance on page two of Exhibit "2", and had
written beneath it, "Buyer accepts counter-offer as written."
Lanny T. Norris then allegedly signed and dated the document
on that day, January 18, 1977.

(Tr., pp. 63, 65)

This

written unconditional acceptance was not delivered to the
defendants, however, until one month later, when it arrived
by mail, on February 17, 1977.

(Tr., pp. 15, 50, 99, 124-

125)
Bryce Taylor acknowledged to Dean Hall that the acceptance was late, having been communicated orally after the fiveday time limit to the defendants' counter-offer had expired.
(Tr., pp. 36, 124)

Thus, he was anxious to see if the Andersons

would recognize the plaintiffs', Norris's tardy unconditional
acceptar.:::;2.

Mr. Hall called Mr. Anderson, and told him that

3ryce Taylor had orally informed him that the Norris brothers
had changed their minds, and wanted to accept the defendants'
counter-offer.

(Tr., pp. 20, 112)

Mr. Anderson responded
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that there wasn't any counter-offer any more; that the
counter-offer was dead.

{Tr., p. 114)

Because Mr. Anderson felt that his counter-of.fer to
the plaintiffs, Norris, had expired, while at the same tilne
Bryce Taylor was urging that he consider their late, uncontlitional

acce~tance

thereof, Dean Hall sought the advice of

his broker, Mackey Boley.

That evening {January

is,

1977),

after arrangements had been made to meet with the Andersohs
on the follbwing day, Mr. Boley indicated that he also felt
that the cot.inter-offer had expired.

Mr. Boley, on his behalf,

then had De~ Hall draft another offer to purchase the
Ander~on prbperty for himself.

{Exhibit "11";

.Tr., pp. 130·

133)

On Wediiesday morning, January 19, 1977, Dean Hall
arrived first at the Andersons' home, and indicated that he
had a second offer,· from Mackey Boley, to purchase the proper·
ty.

Bryce otaylor the~ arrived, and Mr. Hal 1 told him that

there were how two offers to consider.
126, 135)

{Tr., pp. 22; 37, 101,

Moments later, Paul Taylor, father of Br~c~ Taylor

and broker of the plaintiff, Taylor National !teal Estate,

"

arrived and attempted to coerce the Andersoris into· agreeing
to honor the late unconditional acceptanc:le of the d~fendants'
\

counter-offer by L.K.L. Associates.

Although Bryce Taylot

had apparently brought the signed unconditional acdeptance
{page two of Exhibit "2") with him to the meeting, it was
never shown to nor left with Mr. Anderson.
36-39, 48, l02-103, 105, 124-125, 139)

{Tr. , pi:>. 2 2,

The Boley offer w.is
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withdrawn the same day.

(Tr., pp. 129-130)

Later that afternoon, Kim and Lanny Norris stopped by
the Andersons' home.
ever met face-to-face.

It was the first time the parties had
The Norris brothers offered to

meet or beat any offer made by Mr. Boley, and Mr. Anderson
told them that he refused to enter a bidding situation, and
that, if they had unconditionally accepted his counteroffer within the time limited in it, they would have.bought
the property.

(Tr., pp. 22-24, 66-69, 72, 103-104)

On February 16, 1977, plaintiffs then filed this action
and, for the first time, mailed to the Andersons a copy of
the fully executed unconditional acceptance of the defendants' counter-offer (page two of Exhibit "2") by L.K.L.
Associates (the Norris brothers) .

The document was received

by the Andersons on February 17, 1977,

~month

after the

purported unconditional acceptance thereof, which was the
first time the unconditional acceptance, in writing, was
ever seen by either the Andersons or Dean Hall (Tr., pp. 15,
50, 99, 124-125), during all of which time, such purported
written acceptance remained in the exclusive possession and
control of the plaintiffs, with the power and opportunity in
them to alter, amend, assert, or withhold as they saw fit.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDAf4TS' COUNTER-OFFER WAS REJECTED BY PLAINTIFFS'
QUALIFIED ARD CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AND COULD N0T BE
REVIVED IN lTS ORIGINAL FORM BY A SUBSEQUENT ACCEPTANCE.
It must first be remembered that the facts of this case
must be vie~ed in the light most favorable to the judgment
entered by the trial court, which is presumed to be correct;
and that sudh judgment should be sustained, unless the eviden
clearly pre~onderates against it.

Stucki v. Stucki, 562

P.

2d 240 (Utah 1977); Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P. 2d 393 (Utah
1977); Oberffansly v. Earle, 572 P. 2d 1384 (Utah 1977).

•

±t is ~lementary contract law that a binding contract
can exist ottly where there has been mutual assent by the
1

parties, maftife'sting their intention to be boUnd by its terms,
Allen v. BiSsinger &

co.,

62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.t.R.

376 (1923); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P .. 2d 597
(1962).

Futthe;rmore, there is no liability to perfdfiti a

spJcified a8t ciitil the person to whom an offer
made has acc~pted it according to its terms.

has.be~n

17 Am,

Jur.

2d

Coritracts § 32 (1964).
When tlie plaintiffs first tendered their origihai offer,
dated January 7, l91'f, its terms were so contrary tb the
reciuirements of the listing agreement (Exhibit "l'i) ·that the
defendant, Mr. Andeison, rejected it outright.
95)

C1'ri, PP· 13,

That act terminated and destroyed plaintiffs' bffer, ~d

the trial court so found.

The Andersons then formulated theit

seven-point counter-offer, which was signed, dated, and pteTaylor,
agent
forbythe
Norris
btothers,
on
Sponsored by the sented
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Tuesday, January 11, 1977, thereby replacing the plaintiffs'
original offer.

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts§ 40 (1964).

Thus,

the defendants' counter-offer is the only viable. offer or
counter-offer with which we are concerned in this case.

When,

therefore, on Friday, January 14, 1977, Kim L. Norris
allegedly accepted five of the seven points of the defendants'
counter-offer, but rejected two of the conditions specified
therein, the defendants' counter-offer was thereby terminated.

The trial court specifically held that this qualified

and conditional acceptance amounted to a rejection of the
Andersons' counter-offer:
Any words or acts of the offeree indicating that he
declines the offer, or which justify the offeror in
inferring that the offeree intends not to accept the
offer or give it further consideration, amounts to
a rejection • • • • Likewise, the preparation of a
new contract with different terms and provisions for
consideration of the offerer is a rejection of his
offer. An offer is rejected ~ a counter-offer,
and in tiiTs-re5Pect ~qualified or conditional acceptance constitutes a counter-offer •••• (Emphasis added.)
17 Am. Jur. 2d contracts§ 39 (1964).

Th@

AO~@ptana@

of an offer

which is necessary to create

i ~ift~ifi~ 'C'Ofi~fa~t ~~uires mafiifestation of unconditional
'

.

agreement to all of the terms of the offer, and intent

~o

be

bound thereby, and must not add any new material conditions
thereto or deviate therefrom.

R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v.

Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P. 2d 817 (1952); Williams v. Espey,
11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P. 2d 903 (1961).

Here, where plain-

tiffs' qualified and conditional acceptance was specifically

made subject to deletion of a SO-foot easement and subject
!!_so to seller's acceptance of the second mortgage provision
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contained ih the plaintiffs' original offer, and M.r. Anderson
,

adamantly refused to delete either point from his

~ounter

offer ~ no m~l!!ting of the minds was reached, and, e<;ihsequently,
the defendahts' counter-offer was rejected.
As a r@sult of such rejection, the trial court specHically found that the defendants' counter-offer

coul~

not, by

a subsequen~ act of the rejecting offeree (L.K.L. Associates),
be accepted in its original form:
An off~r

is terminated by rejection and cannot
therealter be accepted so as to create a contract.
Having pnce rejected the offer, the offeree dgnnot
revive:it by tendering acceptance.
(Emphasis·
added.j 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 39 (1964).
In Burttm v. Coombs, 557 P. 2d 148 (Utah 1976}, this

Cotlrt held that, if an offer is rejected by refusal,

' j!

~

tidnal acceiplance, or by counter-offer, the party makintj the
original od~r is relieved from liability, and the P,arty who
rejected the offer cannot, of his own volition; create an
agreement by his subsequent acceptance:
.

'

We hold~ therefore, ~ ~ matter of law, defenda~~s
were nQt bound by an offer which had been un~qui~o
cally iejected by plaintiffs and which had not been
renewed prior to plaintiffs' subsequent attempt to
effect an acceptance.
(Emphasis added.) 557 P. 2d
at 150.
•.).

Plaintiffs make some claim that there was a "firm and
absolute

'

reri~wal"

!!
ot reinstatement by defendants of their

original cottriter-offer on ~onday, Jantlary 17, 1977.

There

·is no competent evidence to support such ah assertion, and
<

the tri~l cotirt specifically so found.
First, on Saturday I January 15 I 1971, wheh Br~/~e Taylor
attempted to persuade the Andersons to delete the two points
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of their counter-off er which the Norris brothers had found
unacceptable, Mr. Anderson adamantly.refused to do so, and
declared that the counter-offer had to be accepted by the
Norris brothers

exactly~

written.

(Tr., pp. 16-17, 98-99,

104-105, 111-112, 113, 121-122)
Furthermore, on Monday, January 17, 1977, when Dean Hall
called Mr. Anderson back to see how he felt about the plaintiffs' purported qualified and conditional acceptance of his
counter-offer, Mr. Anderson still refused to bend on either
of the two points of his counter-offer, and reiterated that
he would only accept it as written and submitted.
122, 137)

(Tr., pp.

Then, after Mr. Hall called back and lnformed him

of Bryce Taylor's words, "The Norris brothers can do no more,"

Mr. Anderson told Dean Hall that the counter-offer had expired,
and that the deal was off.
q~estioning

Despite repeated and insistent

by plaintiffs' counsel (the identical issue

having been previously raised by plaintiffs in their Motion
to Compel Answers to Oral Interrogatories, which Motion was
denied by the trial court), Mr. Anderson's clear and unequivpcal testimony is that, on Monday, January 17, 1977, he did
not say that he would stand on the counter-offer.

(Tr., pp.

18-20)
In the face of this unrebutted evidence, the trial court
found that the communication back to Taylor was that the

•

counter-offer as submitted was all that the Andersons would
agree to.

In its Decision dated February 14, 1978, the court

held:
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The plaintiffs' contention that conduct of the defend- I
ants ijither by word or action extended the f1ve-day
period on the counter-offer, ot in any manner constituted a waiver of that limitation, is without suppott I
in thi evidence, and plaintiffs have failed ~prov! ·
these bontentions.
(Emphasis added.)
In li4ht of the foregoing, respondents respectfully
submit that. the defendants' counter-offer was terminated and
rejected by plaintiffs' qualified and conditional ~cceptance
dated Januatr 14, 1977; that it was unequivocally.rejectetl

on January 17, 1977, when Bryce Taylor informed the defentl·
anls, thro\l~h Dean Hall, that "the Norris brothers can do rte

mote";

ci:nd that it could not be revived in its original

form by a pdtported subsequent acceptance.

Burton v. coqffibs,

supra.
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POINT II

THE COUNTER-OFFER OF DEFENDANTS EXPIRED BEFORE PLAINTIFFS
PURPORTED TO ACCEPT IT.
Plaintiffs next contend that their purported acceptance
of defendants' counter-offer was made within the time limit
prescribed therein.

It is undisputed that all parties con-

cerned clearly understood the nature and consequences of
that limitation.

On Tuesday, January 11, 1977, at the Andersons'

direction, Bryce Taylor himself, agent for the Norris brothers,
drafted the language of defendants' counter-offer (Exhibit

"2"), "Subject to buyer's acceptance within five days"

{Tr.,

pp. 28-29, 41-42, 95-97, 119-120), and the Andersons affixed
that date (January 11, 1977) to their counter-of£er.
On Saturday, January 15, 1977, Mr. Anderson. told Bryce
Taylor that the Norris brothers still had one day left before
the expiration of the five-day limit on the counter-offer,
and that he would honor his commitlllent until that time.
(Tr., pp. 104-105, 113)

When asked what he meant by that

statement, Mr. Anderson specifically declared that the acceptance
had to be within the five-day period.

(Tr., p.

110)

More-

over, when Kim and Lanny Norris stopped by the Andersons'
home on Wednesday, January 19, 1977, Mr.

Anderson told them

that, if they had unconditionally accepted his counter-offer_
within the time limit, they would have bought the property,
and each of the Norris brothers acknowledged that statement.
~r.,

pp. 22-24, 66-69, 72, 103-104)
It is clear, therefore, that apart from any considerations

of rejection by the plaintiffs, Norris, of the defendants'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

-15-

counter-offet, where the Andersons fixed a specific time
limit of five days, within which time plaintiffs were
required to accept their counter-offer, and at the same
time dated sUch counter-offer, it expired by its owrl terms
upon the 1ap9e of those five days without unconditidnal
acceptanc~ thereof:

The timn within which an acceptance must be made
is corriUative with the duration of the offer •. An
offereels power of acceptance continues until:tetminatea ~Y acceptance or rejection or by any othet
means r'garded as effective by law. The proposer
may lin\lt the time for acceptance, since every person
has the right to dictate the terms upon which J:ie· will
contrac~, and ~ offer which specifies ~ time for
its dur tion terminates £y the lapse of the t;lrlte
therein; the acceptance must take place
s ec fi
within hat time . . . • (Emphasis added.)
17 Am• Jur.
2d Con acts----s-56 (1964).
If the terms of an offer to buy or sell real estate
stipula~e that the acceptance of such offer· is to
be made within a certain time, it is esserttiali
in order to constitute a binding contract; for.
the off@res to comntunicate his acceptance :within
the ticia stipulated; upon the lapse of ~ ~
the offlr terminates ipso facto, and acceetance
thereaf er is of no legal effect. . • . (Emphasis added.)
77 Am. Jur.~d--Vendor and Purchaser § 20 (1975) •
I

The UtaH statute regarding computation of time;. Utah

Cod~ Ann.

§

~8-3-7, prescribes:

The ti~e in which any act provided by law is td
be done'.is computed by excluding the firs~ q.._f{ .
and including the last, unless the last is ~ hs1iday, and then it also is excluded.
Thus, the defendants' counter-offer, dated

Tu~Jday,

January 11, l977, would have expired by its own terrllp five
days later, dn Sunday, January 16, 1977.
Utah Code Antt.
legal holiday.

§

However, under

63-13-2, every Sunday is deemed to be a
Therefore, the trial court found that
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Sunday, January 16, 1977, was not counted, so that plaintiffs had through Monday, January 17, 1977, to accept the
defendants' counter-offer, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

68-3-8:

Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a
work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or
contract to be performed upon a particular day,
which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be
performed upon the next succeeding business day
with the same effect as if it had been performed
upon the day appointed. (Emphasis added.)
The evidence is further undisputed that on Monday,
January 17, 1977, when Dean Hall called Bryce Taylor and
told him that Mr. Anderson refused to bend on either of
the two points of his counter-offer, Mr. Taylor replied,
"The Norris brothers can do no more."
122-123, 137-138)

(Tr.,

pp~

34-35, 47,

When Bryce Taylor's words were relayed

back to Mr. Anderson, he told Dean Hall that the counter-offer
had expired, and that the deal was off.

(Tr., pp. 18-20)

More importantly, on Tuesday, January 18, 1977, after the
Norris brothers had purportedly accepted the defendants'
counter-offer, for the first time unconditionally, Bryce
Taylor himself acknowledged to Dean Hall that the acceptance
was late.

(Tr., pp. 36, 124)

Finally, the evidence is clear that neither the Andersons
nor Dean Hall ever saw or received the plaintiffs' purported
acceptance in writing, dated Tuesday, January 18, 1977, until
~month

later, on February !2_, 1977, after thi:s lawsuit was

filed, when they received it by mail.
124-125)

(Tr. , pp. 15, 50, 99,

During that entire time, such purported written

acceptance remained in the exclusive possession and control
of theby the
plaintiffs,
subject
tofor digitization
their power
and
opportunity
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to do with !s they saw fit.
In vie~ of this evidence, the trial court held that
"The plaintiffs did not accept defendants' counter-'offer on
the 17th of January, which was the 6th day after t)fo counteroffer had bi:!en

mad~

by defendants."

Under the best view of

plaintiffs' evidence, no acceptance was made until Tuesday,
January 18, 1977, which acceptance was not conununicated ih
writing to defendants until one month later.
Mr. Andersbn clearly intended for his counter~offer lo
expire within five days, and such provision must be constru~
in accordantie with the intention of the parties.
2d Contract~§ 329 (1964).

17 Arn. Jur,

Thus, even if the counter•offer

was not terminated and rejected by plaintiffs' quapfied arld
conditional .acceptance of Friday, January 14, 1977, it rtever·
theless explted after five days by its own terms.
The Nof~is brothers constituted Bryce Taylor as their
agent to corl~ey their original offer to the defendan~s on
January 7°, t~77, a,ntl, by so doing, also constituted.him as
their agent lo receive, on their behalf, any acceptahde or

.

.

rejection tH~teof or other response thereto.

The

delivert

of the defertdants' signed and dated counter-offer to Mr. Taylor
0Jl

January

ii

I

1977 I ,Wai:i; therefore 1 tantamount tO delivery

of the same to the Norris brothers (L.K.L. Associates) on
:

•

· that date, dhd the time limited therein for acceptance thereof
comtnenced td run on the date of such delivery (Tuesday,
January 11, l977).
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POINT III
PLAINTIFFS NEVER PRODUCED A BUYER WHO WAS READY, WILLING,
AND ABLE TO PURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ACCORDING TO THE
TERMS OF THE LISTING.
Without exception, every authority relied upon by plaintiffs in their brief states that a broker is entitled to a
commission when he finds a buyer who.is ready, willing, and
able to purchase, but only according to the terms specified
in the listing agreement.

On the other hand, a broker is not

entitled to the compensation called for by his contract of
employment until he produces a person who is ready, willing,
and able both to accept and live
his principal.

~

to the terms offered

~

Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772, 20

A.L.R. 280 (1921); 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers § 183 (1964).
Such ability to perform by a prospective purchaser is
defined as follows:
••• [I]t is clear in general that the proposed purchaser must have the legal capacity to purchase,
in addition to having sufficient financial ability
not only to make the initial payment required to meet
the terms of the seller, but also to complete the
contract of purchase according to its terms -- that
is, to meet any deferred payments.--=-:-. (Emphasis added.)
12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers§ 184 (1964).
Even if plaintiffs were financially able to meet the terms
specified by defendants, their offer never
terms.

complied with such

The listing agreement, Exhibit "l", specified a

total sales price of $250,000.00, with a down payment of
$40,000.00, and terms for the payment of the balance to be
negotiated with the seller.

Bryce Taylor himself admitted

that the plaintiffs' original offer, Exhibit "2", dated
January 7, 1977, was not in conformity with those terms.
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(Tr., pp. 40, 95)
The Sai~s Agency Contract itself, Exhibit "lJ, entitles
a broker to his commission, as cited in plaintiffs',brief 1
only when hS procures

a

party ready, willing, and ~~le to

buy "at the i>rice and ~ stated her~on, or at ~uch ~

price;~ tetjns to Which !.. may agree in writing.

ckmphaSiS

II

added.)
PlaintH:fs' offer pursuant to the said listin~ iagreentent
dated Januaty 7, 1977 (Exhibit "2"), consisted of

?5,ooo.oo

down and $1~,ooo.oo payable on January 30, 1977, which cononi~

stituted

one-half of the down payment required by the

listing agrd~ment.
defendants.

',,

Such proposal was never agreed to by

Instead, the first of the seven

point~Qf

their counte!f-offer (attached as page two of E}i:hibit "2")
was, for $25;000.00 down.

This counter-offer, as pte~ibusly

ud~er Points I and II, supra, was first
January l~, 1977, by plaintiffs' qualified ~nd

disbussed

reje.tJted

on

oondi tiohal

'·

ac:::c~ptance; ijxpired by its own terms after the ,laped of fi\re

on

day~; and wa! expressi:Y and unequivocally rejedted;
i

January

'

17;. 1977, by the words, "the Norris brothers can do ·no more.

~

No· hnci:,onditibnal acceptarice was ever conununicated to lhe
:

t

I

def~ndants jrttil after January 17, 1977, and, in fact, was
e~er deliver~d to the defendants in writing until orts'month
f

had elapsed.
Plaintiffs' original, and all subsequent dffer~ thrbugh
'

January

,,

17~ 1977, were clearly at odds with the tehAs iiuthor'

ized by deferldants, as sellers, in their listing agriiletnent.
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1

Thus:
Where a broker, instead of procuring a person who
is ready, able, and willing to accept the terms his
principal authorized him to offer at the time of-his employment, procures one who makes a counteroffer more or less at variance with that of his
employer, the latter-is at liberty either to accept
the proposed party upon the altered terms or to
decline to do so, without giving the broker his
reasons for the refusal. If he accepts he is
legally obligated to compensate the broker for the
services rendered, but if he refuses he incurs no
liability therefor. In other words, if the principal does not ~ fit to modify his original
pro;rsals the broker can lay !!2.. ~ to his
comillssions until he produces ~ person who Is
ready, able, and willing to accept the exact terms
of his principal.
(Emphasis added.) 12 Am. Jur.
2d Brokers§ 185 (1964).
This Court addressed this precise issue in Hansen v.
Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P. 2d 1070 (1960).

In that case,

the listing agreement specified a price of $43,000.00 cash,
followed by a recital in the seller's handwriting, "terms
to suit the seller."

The broker produced a prospective purchaser,

but the seller demanded 10% interest on the deferred balance,
to which the buyer refused to agree.

The broker brought an

action for his commission, which was awarded by the trial
court.

This Court reversed, holding that the seller could not

be held to any commitmrnt othrr than the terms expressed in
the real estate sales agency contract:
••• The proposed buyer being unwilling to purchase upon
the terms insisted upon by her [defendant seller],
cannot be regarded as a willing purchaser under the
contract she signed, and the plaintiff cannot compel
her to pay his commission.
This disposition of ~ ~ obviates the necessity
of considering the plaintiff's claim that he ~
entitled to be awarded attorney's.fees under the prhvisions in the contract.
(Emphasis addecr:-y- rr-uta
2d at 66-,-3~P. 2d at 1072.
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To the same effect, see, Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 376 ,(1951);
sproui v. Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 (1949;); Lynn Y.:.
~·
. J

K.C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 3, 425 P. 2d 403 (1.967);
;t:

Clegg •·

Le~,

30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P. 2d 348

P.

Modula, 557

(1973)~

Weaver v.

2d 152 (Utah 1976).

In Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 P. 2d 594 {Utah 1976),

•

cited by plaintiffs in their brief, the listing agreement
..

ll

called for tt sales price of $400, 000. 00, to which ithe buyers
counter-off~red $250,000.00.

commission

lb

The Court refused td· ~ward cl

the broker:

• ~.• Whei-1:! such a counter-offer of a lesser amo;,,_i).t is
niade, the seller is at liberty to accept the 6~ter,
but is under no obligation to do so; and if he
tefuse8, he incurs no liability for the real est~te
comntisSion. 558 P. 2d at 596.

2d

More recently, in Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.
(Utah 1977)

i

1112

the defendants' letter authorizing sai~ fixed

~ purchase ptice of $950,000.00, subject to approval of a
t

.,I

specified irlsurance company, and separating th!!! "Denta1
Building" from the transaction.

The plaintiff

brok~t:' present~

an Earne~t ~Oney Receipt and Offer to Purchaset offeting a
price of $9~i,5oo.oo, subject to the insurance compahy's
mortgage,· arid to a lease-back ll.greement by the sellers.

the I

plaintiff brt>ker brought an action for his comrliission1 and
trial court tound for the defendant sellers.

the,

This C~Urt

affirmed, detlaring:
The law is well settled that the broker is not .
entitled to a real estate commission untii he;ttas
a written binding offer or agreement signed by•
a ready~ willing and able purchaser. This means
that a11 of the terms and conditions must, be
upon between the parties. Since all of the te.rns

aireed
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parties, no
(Emphasis added.) """"'5"67 P.

~~agreed ~between ~

commission was earned.
2d at 1114.-

In sum, plaintiffs never complied with the terms of the
listing agreement, nor was the counter-offer of defendants
accepted by plaintiffs according to the precise terms required
therein.

Because, therefore, plaintiffs never produced a buyer

who was ready, willing, and able to meet the exact terms of
the seller, they are not entitled to any real estate cornmission.

Furthermore, under the authority of Hansen v. Snell,

supra, they are not entitled to an award of attorney's fees
under the provisions of the listing agreement or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The defendants' counter-offer was terminated and
rejected by plaintiffs' qualified and conditional acceptance
dated January 14, 1977, and it could not be revived in its
original form by a subsequent acceptance.

Thereafter, on

Monday, January 17, 1977, the counter-offer expired by its
own terms before plaintiffs purported to accept it, and was
expressly rejected by the plaintiffs on that date.

Because

plaintiffs never complied with the exact terms of either
the listing agreement or of the defendants' counter-offer, in
producing a buyer who was ready, willing, and able to meet such
terms, no contract was ever formed, and they are not entitled
to any real estate commission, nor are they entitled to an
award of attorney's fees under the provisions of the listing
agreement or otherwise.
Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment of
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the trial cdi.irt was correct, and request that it be affirnled,

V. PERSHING NELSO
PATRICK B. NOLAN
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Respondents

•
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